Introduction
The medical treatment of minors is governed by a variety of laws. In some specialist treatment areas statutes and regulations have been enacted: For example, if a minor enters a clinical trial, the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 apply; if he wants to donate an organ, the Human Tissue Act 2004 applies; if he has a mental health problem, the Mental Health Act 1983 might apply. In general, however, the common law decision of Gillick [1986] establishes that minors (defined here as those under the age of 16 unless expressly stated) can consent to treatment if they have the requisite maturity and understanding. Lord Scarman said:
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed [p.
188H-189A].
A competent minor will be encouraged to involve his parents, but the doctor gains the requisite authority for treatment from the minor. He need not secure the consent of a parent unless the minor fails to satisfy the test and is deemed incompetent to decide.
Lord Scarman refers specifically to consent but it might be assumed that:
1. A child competent to consent to treatment would also be competent to refuse it.
2. If competence to consent to treatment gives the minor authority to consent, then competence to refuse treatment will give the minor authority to refuse it.
Both assumptions are called into question following two controversial Court of Appeal decisions: Re R [1991] and Re W [1992] . In both cases adolescents were denied the power to refuse 1 life-sustaining medical treatment, regardless of their competence. The reasoning rested partly on the role of consent in this situation. The legal doctrine of consent serves to provide the clinician with a defence to a claim in battery. In turn, the law of battery protects patients' autonomy rights. Consequently, if the act does not constitute a battery (or another relevant tort) then the invasion of autonomy is lawful. Lord Donaldson said that consent gives doctors a 'flak jacket' against a claim in battery. Doctors can get the flak jacket from the competent minor, but if the minor is unwilling or unable to provide it, it can come from a parent or the court.
Re R and Re W were applied in a number of cases in the 1990s and most recently in Re P [2003] . Since that time, children's rights have evolved to the extent that aspects of Re R and
Re W are now questionable (Taylor, 2007 Thornton (1992 ), Freeman (1995 ). Much of it focuses on the first assumption, though Gilmore and Herring (2011) rationalise the asymmetry. They argue that if the competence required to consent is different to the competence required to refuse all treatment, then provided the refusal is not competent, the law can still be said to uphold minors' competent decisions. In other words, in rebutting the first assumption, the law might avoid rebutting the second. A co-author and I have argued elsewhere that their distinction is troubling (Cave and Wallbank, 2012 provisions to reflect the development of children's autonomy rights but which recognise that competent minors lack the authority to refuse treatment which their welfare interests demand.
Through this examination I gain insight into the potential options before a court, in the event that a challenge to Re R and Re W is mounted.
Competence and the right to decide
One of the criticisms levelled at Lord Donaldson's distinction between consent to and refusal of treatment, is that it offends the principle that negative autonomy rights (rights to refuse intervention) are stronger than positive autonomy rights. If, as Lord Goff states, the right to refuse treatment flows from the 'principles of selfdetermination', then this as much a right of a competent minor as it is a right of a competent adult.
On this basis there is a strong argument for respecting competent refusals. However, by exploring the law in more detail, it becomes apparent that the dicta in Re T is context specific.
The link between respect for self-determination, competence and authority to decide (ie to consent or refuse) is not applied universally. This, in turn, has implications for the debate on adolescent treatment refusals.
Autonomy and competence
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Autonomy has been hailed the king of the four principles (Gillon, 2003) . In its simplest form it involves 'deliberated self rule' (Gillon, 1994) However, the law is influenced by factors which go beyond the autonomy of the bearer. individual is 'unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain' (s. 2(1)), and lacks the requisite understanding to the extent that the patient is unable to make a decision (s. 3).
Thus, the assumption that a competent decision is necessarily equated to an autonomous decision is flawed. In this section I have shown that what the bearer must do to be considered competent depends on the situation. Legal competence does not equate to natural or de facto competence. In the next sections I will make a linked observation -that the value of competence in medical treatment decision-making depends on the situation.
Treatment refusals by adult might be vetoed
If it is accepted that the law determines the relationship between self-determination and competence, then Lord Goff's link between competence, the right to consent and the right to refuse is context-specific. Indeed, an examination of relevant statutes reveals that a refusal of consent by a competent adult is not always determinative. First, there are cases where an adult might be forced to undergo treatment in order to protect others. This might be justified on the basis of J.S. Mill's harm principle that the only legitimate reason to interfere with a person's liberty is to prevent harm to others (Mill, 1959 The effect of section 63 is to limit the autonomy of the detained patient whose capacity is unimpaired to treatments that are not related to the mental illness of disorder for which he is detained.
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It is clear then, that Lord Goff's assertion that the principles of self-determination override the state's duty to act in what doctors determine to be in his best interests is context specific.
The right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment which exists at common law is not mirrored in the statutes examined in this section. As we shall see, for minors too, Parliament has decreed that competence does not necessarily give the authority to consent; and even if it does, it is not necessarily the only source of authority.
Treatment refusals by minors may be vetoed
We have seen that there is considerable variation in the rights which flow from a finding in law that an adult's medical treatment decision is competent. The same applies to children, but in their case, their special legal status is a relevant consideration. There are numerous restrictions on their rights and responsibilities which are lifted when they achieve adult status.
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The law balances minors' autonomy interests with their basic interests (for example, their interest in health) and their developmental interests (Eekelaar, 1986) interests and public protection (Laing, 2000) . From the minor's perspective, the different principles inherent in the various applicable laws make for an inconsistent set of rights.
Depending on their age and vulnerability, minors might be affected by laws designed to will.' The risks inherent in research might be thought to justify this paternalistic approach, but it is not one which is enforced in all cases where a child is given risky treatment. For example, the same experimental treatment which a child would have no power to consent to or refuse might be given to him 'off label' (unlicensed) in which case his authorisation might be accepted even in the face of parental opposition (Gillick, 2009) . Not only are children unable to provide the legal authorisation required to participate in a clinical trial, but they are not necessarily required to assent to it (though their assent, particularly if competent, is encouraged). 
Minors and the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended)
Under the Mental Health Act, formal, compulsory treatment is the option of last resort (DH/NHMHE (2009) The emphasis of the provisions for treating minors with a mental disorder is less on ensuring that their decision is autonomous and more on ensuring that minors are compliant, and that they get the treatment which doctors consider to be in their best interests. The aim seems to be to reduce the incidences, as far as possible, of coercive treatment and to limit unnecessary restrictions on liberty. Formal detention might be utilised on the basis that the minor is refusing treatment rather than because the minor lacks the competence to refuse the treatment.
Similarly, a minor who has fluctuating competence but who is expected to refuse consent when they regain competence might be detained under the Mental Health Act rather than 13 awaiting a return of competence before a decision is made (DH/NIMHE, p. 38). In relation to minors aged 16 and 17, the Guide for Professionals recommends that the Mental Capacity Act is not relied upon where:
There is some other specific identifiable risk that the young person might not receive the treatment they need … and that either the young person or others might potentially suffer harm as a result. (DH/NIMHE, p. 39).
Relevant Codes require that a minor whose consent is relied upon is not subject to any undue influence (DH/NIMHE, 2.6), but the implication is that it is undue influences which result in a decision which does not reflect the best interests of the minor and society which will not be tolerated. Under this legislation a distinction emerges between different levels of compulsion.
In seeking authorisation for treatment, practitioners might promise a minor: 'consent or we will seek court authorisation and force you to undergo treatment.' The minor might later thank the doctor in the manner of Odysseus who ordered his crew to tie him to the mast so that he might resist the sirens. A minor whose disease prevents her from recognising the fact that her objection is a short lived product of her illness is not making an autonomous decision, whether she consents or refuses. Nevertheless her consent is likely to be respected and her refusal overridden.
The 2007 amendments respond to developments in the jurisprudence of children's rights, including their autonomy rights. I have shown that the amendments leave considerable scope for manipulating or overriding the competent decisions of minors to refuse treatment. In the next section I consider the implications for adolescent treatment refusals at common law.
Gillick
If we accept that competence confers different rights and authority on the bearer depending on the purpose of the particular law, then this begs the question: what was the purpose of Gillick? Unfortunately, the Law Lords did not make clear whether they intended competence to confer merely a right to consent, or a broader right to decide between relevant options (potentially including the refusal of life-sustaining treatment). Gillick competence gives minors decisional authority to agree to treatment which doctors believe to be in their best interests, but the question remains: does it also enable minors to make decisions which are contrary to their medical interests? The test for competence is decision-specific and thus the threshold of understanding and maturity is commensurate with the gravity of the decision.
Recall the first assumption. If this is rebutted, a minor who is competent to consent may be held to lack competence to refuse treatment upon which her life depends. On this method, the link between competence and authority is retained -the second assumption is preserved.
Paternalistic protection of the minor is achieved by raising the threshold for competence, perhaps even making it impossible to achieve. The problem with this interpretation is that it subjectivises the Gillick competence test and makes it outcome-rather than decision-specific.
This distances the concept from a reflection of the minor's capacity for self-determination.
Alternatively, it is arguable that, when the case was heard, the intention was not to transfer to minors the authority to decide between treatment and no treatment, but instead to confer a much more limited right. Arguably this right merely enabled minors to provide the authority for a course of action which coincides with their best interests. Harris has scathingly referred to this as a 'a right to acquiesce in a decision which has already been taken' (Harris, 2003) .
Even on this conception, the power was of some value, for by enabling competent minors to provide the authority for treatment, parental consent is not necessarily required. Competent minors gain a right to confidentiality.
Maclean (2008) has argued that Gillick merely confers a right to make decisions in the child's best interests, and that, on this basis, a distinction can be drawn between powers to consent and to veto treatment. If this is so then Gillick is just one of a number of examples where competence confers only limited authority on the bearer -in this case, a right to make a decision which coincides with their best interests.
Rights
Would this position be compatible with human rights arguments? Let us return to Lord Goff's assertion that the right to refuse treatment is part of the right to self-determination. Article Nonetheless, some countries take a different approach, enabling competent minors to make an authoritative refusal of treatment, and linking competence and authority in a wider range of situations (eg Ribot, 2012) . Though there has yet to be a test case, Scotland probably supports such a right (Elliston, 2007) ).
Conclusion
I have not entered into the debate as to whether the law ought to safeguard the best interests of minors by protecting them from their own competent medical treatment decisions. Indeed I have made brief reference to the questionable morality of laws limiting the rights of competent adults and minors to make decisions which do not comply with a paternalistic judgement of welfare. One option before the court in a test case would be to declare that competent minors have the same rights to consent to and refuse medical treatment as adults.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, another option would be to confirm Re R and Re W so that parents and the court retain the ability to override minors' competent treatment refusals out of respect for their 'best interests'. Alternatively, the court might seek to improve the protection of minors' autonomy rights whilst retaining the option of restricting minors whose decisions are contrary to their best interests. This might be achieved by rebutting one of two assumptions which might be thought to flow from Gillick:
I have suggested ways in which a test case might rebut the second assumption and how this might be justified on the basis of precedent and human rights. In addition, I have put forward an argument that this would be a preferable route to protecting minors' interests to rebutting the first assumption by accepting that the threshold for competence to consent is lower than the threshold for competence to refuse medical. Though rebuttal of the first assumption would enable the court (if it so wished) to uphold the second assumption, the victory for minors' autonomy rights would be hollow, as doctors and courts would be able to raise the competence threshold to very high or impossible levels whenever the outcome of the minor's decision is contrary to (what they perceive to be) his best interests.
I have argued that the distinction between competence and authority is a feature of a number of laws relating to medical treatment decisions of both adults and minors and that this position does not necessarily conflict with the Human Rights Act 1998. Children's autonomy rights have evolved since Re R and Re W (Perera, 2008) . In Axon [2006] Justice Silber argued that parental rights under Article 8(1) dwindle until the child is competent to make his own decisions, at which point they disappear altogether (Cave, 2009 ). The result is that, in a test case, the court might choose to follow the example of the Mental Health Act 2007 and enhance protection of minors' rights by limiting the rights of parents to consent when their child refuses, but retain the jurisdiction of the court to override a competent decision. In theory this would apply to decisions to consent as well as to refuse. Consider, for example, a minor who is offered an abortion which a parent challenges in court on the basis that it is contrary to the minor's best interests. In practice, however, it is more likely to be exercised in relation to refusals of treatment, as doctors rarely offer treatment to a minor which might be perceived as contrary to his best interests.
We have seen that under the Mental Health Act, compulsion is a last resort, but the scheme does not eschew a softer form of paternalism whereby the minor might be persuaded to agree to treatment rather than face possible court authorisation or compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act. Similar reasoning might be applied to minors who initially refuse to comply with the recommendations of clinicians in relation to treatment for physical health problems. The fact that the court can overrule a competent decision to refuse life saving treatment might be utilised by clinicians to persuade the minor to accept treatment. Nor is this form of paternalism universally reviled. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that investment goods (where the cost is borne immediately but the benefit enjoyed later) are 'prime candidates for nudges'. They show that no choice is neutral and that a nudge in the right direction is an acceptable form of paternalism.
The law might utilise the concept of competence to control who may claim it; the circumstances in which it might be claimed; and its bearing on who has the authority to make the relevant decision. If the court retains the jurisdiction to override a competent treatment decision by a minor, then competence does not give him a right to self-determination, but a more limited right to have his opinion considered when the court determines what is in his best interests (Cave, 2011) . The greater the minor's competence, the stronger his 'voice' will be.
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